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A TALE OF TWO STATUTES: TWENTY YEAR 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CITIZEN SUIT 
PROVISION IN THE CONNECTICUT 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT AND THE 
MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT 
Andrew J. Piela* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The era from the late 1960s through the 1970s was a watershed in 
the field of environmental law. Throughout the United States, there 
emerged a growing public concern over the preservation of our envi-
ronment; a wave fueled on by the disasters at Love Canal in New 
York! and the Valley of the Drums in Tennessee.2 
As Congress labored in Washington to pass legislation on a national 
scale, equally important pieces of legislation were being discussed in 
several state capitals. Professor Joseph Sax, one of the leading writ-
ers in the area of environmental law, argued for the creation of stat-
utes at the state level that would allow concerned private citizens to 
activate the power of the judiciary to protect their state's natural 
resources.3 Sax argued that a private citizen, empowered by this 
legislation, could be an effective defender of the environment.4 In 
1969, Michigan adopted Professor Sax's Model Environmental Protec-
tion Act.5 The Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) be-
* Production Editor, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Richard Roth, Long Buried Poisons Ooze Out of the Ground, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1978, at A2. 
2 Bill Richards, Oozing Earth, WASH. POST, Aug. 4,1978, at C1. 
a JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION, 247-52 
(1971). 
41d. at 56. 
6 Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 
1977) [hereinafter MEPA]. 
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came the model for at least six other states.6 The states' judiciaries, 
however, have molded MEPA and its progeny, and it is the individual 
interpretation of the reach and limitations of each act that has deter-
mined each act's ultimate effectiveness. 
This Comment examines how the state courts have interpreted the 
citizen suit provisions in two acts derived from MEPA, the Connecti-
cut Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (CEPA),7 and the Minne-
sota Environmental Rights Act (MERA).8 Section II of this Comment 
discusses the historical background of both acts and the effectiveness 
of the common law in both Connecticut and Minnesota in providing 
remedies for environmental plaintiffs. Section III examines how the 
Connecticut state courts have addressed the issues of standing, bur-
dens of proof, and the remedies that are provided by CEPA. Section 
IV examines how the Minnesota state courts have dealt with these 
same issues under MERA. Section V analyzes the findings in Sections 
III and IV and discuss how these two acts, both generally similar in 
their language and goals, could have such a radically different effect. 
II. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 
CEPA AND MERA 
Historically, environmental plaintiffs have turned to the common 
law to recover damages.9 The most popular cause of action for plain-
tiffs in environmental litigation is a variant ofnuisance.1o Both private 
nuisancell and public nuisance12 actions are used by plaintiffs to enjoin 
polluters and to collect damages for their injuriesP 
The common law, however, is an imperfect remedy at best. The 
6 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14-21 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 1986); 
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-6-1-1-6 (Burns 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.Ol-.13 (West 1987); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-I3-15 (West 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34A-I0A-I-15 (1986). 
7 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14-21 (West 1985). 
8 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.Ol-.13 (West 1987). 
9 See generally, David P. Bryden, Environmental Rights in Theary and Practice, 62 MINN. 
L. REV. 163, 166 (1977). 
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 821 A-F (1977). 
11 See § 821D (defining private nuisance as non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in 
private use and enjoyment of land). 
12 See § 82IB(I) (defining public nuisance as unreasonable interference with a right common 
to the general public). 
13 Highview North Apartments v. County of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Minn. 1982) (munici-
pality liable for damages under nuisance statute where installation of its water drainage system 
caused damage to plaintiff's basement); Filsko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 404 A.2d 889, 890-92 
(Conn. 1978); Dingwell v. Town of Litchfield, 496 A.2d 213, 215-16 (Conn. App. 1985) (plaintiff 
successful in nuisance action against town when pollutants from town landfill destroy plaintiff's 
well). 
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many procedural and substantive barriers have made recovery very 
difficult for plaintiffs who sue to protect natural resources,14 particu-
larly in Connecticut and Minnesota. Specifically, many private citizens 
who bring suit in these states lose because they are unable to satisfy 
standing requirements.15 In common-law nuisance, a plaintiff has 
standing to sue if that plaintiff can show that the defendant's action 
has caused or will cause that plaintiff direct damage or injury.16 For 
example, in Herrmann v. Larson,17 the plaintiff was able to recover 
damages under common-law nuisance by showing that the defendant's 
wastes directly entered and damaged his property.18 
In contrast, when private citizens sue to protect the environment 
as a whole without a showing of direct injury to themselves, the state 
courts generally have dismissed the cases.19 For example, in Hilland 
v. /ves,20 a Connecticut Superior Court stated that there is an aversion 
to allowing the private citizen to take on the role of attorney general 
14 See Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 109 N.W.2d 749, 753--56 (Minn. 1961) (plaintiff cannot 
rely upon the fact that other people succeeded in a nuisance action against a canning factory, 
plaintiff must show how the factory activities constituted a nuisance against him, specifically); 
Note, Protectian of Scenic and Aesthetic Resaurces Under the Minnesota Enviranmental 
Rights Act, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1190, 1195 (1990) [hereinafter Scenic and Aesthetic 
Resources] (author cites strict standing requirements required for environmental plaintiffs as 
well as high levels of judicial deference shown by state courts toward state and federal defen-
dants). 
15 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Conn. Half-Way House, 218 A.2d 383, 385-86 (Conn. 1966) (plaintiffs 
unsuccessful in an effort to enjoin operation of half-way house because they were unable to show 
how their property would be unreasonably affected by its operation); Jack v. Torrant, 71 A.2d 
705, 708-11 (Conn. 1950) (plaintiff unsuccessful in an effort to enjoin the operation of funeral 
home as he is able to show that its operation would pose real and substantial damage to his 
property); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (West 1988) (statute which codifies common law nuisance 
requires plaintiffs to prove that their property is injuriously affected or the enjoyment of their 
land is lessened). 
16 Herrmann v. Larson, 7 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn. 1943) (plaintiff established nuisance by 
showing waste water from defendant's dairy entered onto and damaged his land); Batcher v. 
City of Staples, 120 Minn. 86 (1912) (cause of action established when plaintiff showed that 
defendant's sewage polluted a stream running near his property); Filsko v. Bridgeport Hydrau-
lic Co., 404 A.2d 889, 890-92 (Conn. 1978) (plaintiff proves nuisance claim with evidence showing 
that his property was damaged by chemicals oozing from the defendant's land); Dingwell v. Town 
of Litchfield, 496 A.2d 213, 215-16 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (plaintiff proves nuisance claim with 
evidence showing chemicals from defendant's landfill leached into the groundwater and de-
stroyed plaintiff's well). 
177 N.W.2d at 330. 
18 [d. at 333. 
19 Hiland v. Ives, 257 A.2d 822, 824 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966); Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342, 
346 (1825) (court concludes that the plaintiff must have more than passing interest or partial 
feeling to establish standing, there needs to be a real and substantial injury or interest); see 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (West 1988) (plaintiff must show injury to their property to bring 
suit under statutory nuisance). 
20 257 A.2d 822 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966). 
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and sue to protect the environment without a showing of direct in-
jury.21 
Even if a plaintiff is able to show sufficient harm for standing and 
satisfy the elements of a nuisance cause of action, remedies, especially 
injunctive relief, have still proven extremely difficult to obtain.22 The 
Connecticut courts will enjoin a defendant's activities only with ex-
treme caution and award an injunction only in the case of an irrepa-
rable injury where there is no adequate remedy at law for the plain-
tiff.23 Furthermore, in order to avoid embarrassment to the 
government, the Connecticut courts have shown a reluctance to en-
join harmful governmental activities, generally showing a great def-
erence to governmental decision-making processes.24 In addition, gov-
ernmental immunity statutes have made bringing suit against the 
state or a political subdivision of the state extremely difficult.25 Fi-
nally, in Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court has, in some cases, 
allowed defendants to continue their harmful activities, determining 
that the defendants have acquired a prescriptive easement to pollute.26 
It is important to note that while the common law was the major 
source of remedies for environmental plaintiffs, it was not the exclu-
sive source in 19th century Connecticut. In 1868, the Connecticut 
legislature, in a move designed to protect and encourage the fishing 
industry, passed an act which allowed private citizens to bring qui 
tam actions against any person, partnership, or corporation that 
caused the release of pollution which was deleterious to clams, oys-
ters, eels, or fish.27 
21 Hilland, 257 A.2d at 824 (Superior Court stated that it might be overrun by self-appointed 
protectors of the public interest). 
22Jedneak v. Minneapolis General Electric Co., 4 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 1942) (plaintiffs 
unable to enjoin operation of power plant which deposited soot and ashes on their property 
because operation of that power plant was reasonable for its location and design). But see, Brede 
v. Minnesota Crushed Stone, 173 N.W. 805, 8074)8 (Minn. 1919) (plaintiff landowners able to 
enjoin operation of quarry even though nuisance effects could not be controlled and quarry was 
operating in an area appropriate for quarrying). 
23 Nicholson v. Conn. Half-Way House, 218 A.2d 383, 386 (Conn. 1966) ("Restraining the action 
of an individual or corporation is an extraordinary action, always to be exercised with caution, 
never without the most satisfying of reasons." (citing Goodwin v. New York, 43 Conn. 494, 500 
(1876»). 
24 Connecticut Employees Union, Independent v. Connecticut State Employees Union, 439 
A.2d 321, 328 (Conn. 1981); Wood v. Town of Wilton, 240 A.2d 904, 907 (Conn. 1968) (Connecticut 
Supreme Court unwilling to enjoin construction of town dump until dump develops into nui-
sance). 
25 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577n (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.13 (West 1987). 
26 See Herrmann v. Larson, 7 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn. 1943). 
27 The Act of 1868 as amended by the Act of 1872 [hereinafter the Act of 1868 as amended]. 
(The text of this act is taken from Blydenburgh v. Miles, 39 Conn. 484, 486 (1872». The Act of 
1868 reads: 
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The Act of 1868 is unique in several respects. First, the Connecticut 
legislature apparently attempted to give private citizens, regardless 
of any personal injury, a chance to sue the polluter to protect the state 
fisheries.28 The Act of 1868 even gave plaintiffs an incentive to use the 
Act by rewarding successful plaintiffs with a payment equal to half of 
the penalty imposed upon the polluter.29 Despite the broad language 
of the Act, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court still held to the 
traditional common law notions of standing which required a showing 
of direct injury on the part of the plaintiff before suit under the Act 
could be commenced.30 
The Act of 1868 established a cause of action that was considerably 
easier to prove than the tort of common-law nuisance. Instead of 
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's actions were an 
unreasonable or unlawful interference with a property of the plaintiff, 
the Act of 1868 spelled out three elements that the plaintiff had to 
prove.31 First, the defendant must be an individual or corporation that 
is engaged in one of the industries enumerated in the Act.32 Second, 
the defendant must have permitted or allowed the substances in 
question to enter the waters of the state.33 Finally, the substance that 
was released must be deleterious to fish, clams, oysters, or eels.34 The 
Every person, partnership or corporation that shall permit or allow any coal, tar, or 
refuse from the manufacture of gas, or refuse from establishments operated to extract 
oil from white-fish, or other deleterious substances to clam, oysters, eels and fish, to 
run, flow, drain or be placed in any of the harbors, rivers, creeks, arms of the sea, or 
waters adjacent to this state, shall forfeit the sum of one hundred dollars, one half to 
him who shall prosecute to effect, and one half to the treasury of the town within which 
the offense is committed. 
The Act of 1872 reads: 
... [A]n act in addition to an act for encouraging and regulating fisheries, shall apply 
to any person, persons, or corporation carrying on the business of manufacturing oil 
or manure from fish or from bones or the carcasses of animals, or of manufacturing 
mineral phosphates or artificial manures; and it shall be deemed in violation of said act 
to permit or allow any of the liquids or materials used or produced in said estab-
lishments or businesses, to run, flow, or drain into or be placed in any of the harbors, 
rivers, creeks, arms of the sea, or any waters adjacent to this state; and the forfeiture 
or penalty provided by said act may be recovered for each and every day that said act 
is violated; and any person may sue for, in his own name, and collect said forfeiture or 
penalty in a proper action on this statute. 
See also Levi Sikorsky, A Special Note of Enviranmental Interest: A Century Old Lesson in 
Ecological Legislatian, 45 CONN. B.J. 313 (1971). 
28 See the Act of 1868 as amended. 
29 The Act of 1868 as amended. 
30 Stow v. Miles, 39 Conn. 426, 427 (1872) (Connecticut Supreme Court denied right of plaintiff 
to recover under Act of 1868 without first alleging some sort of personal aggrievement). 
31 See the Act of 1868 as amended. 
32 The Act of 1868 as amended. 
33 The Act of 1868 as amended. 
34 The Act of 1868 as amended. 
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Connecticut Supreme Court, while finding the wording of the require-
ments ambiguous at best, nevertheless upheld the Act of 1868 in the 
face of a constitutional takings challenge.35 The Act of 1868, however, 
went substantially unused and was eventually repealed in 1901.36 
III. THE CONNECTICUT STATE COURTS' 
INTERPRETATION OF CEPA 
A. Standing in a Private Suit Brought under CEPA 
CEP A was designed to grant automatic statutory standing37 to 
plaintiffs who sought to protect natural resources from unreasonable 
pollution caused by any private person, corporation, association, or 
public entity.38 By enacting CEPA, the Connecticut legislature in-
tended to broaden the traditional notions of standing to include all 
private plaintiffs regardless of whether they suffered a direct injury 
or had a personal economic interest in the litigation.39 State Repre-
sentative John Papandrea specifically emphasized this point in the 
1971 House debates.4o Both houses of the Connecticut General Assem-
bly were aware that, without a broad grant of standing in CEPA, 
CEPA would be relatively useless because few plaintiffs could allege 
the necessary direct injury to satisfy the common law notions of 
standing.41 
35 See Blydenburgh v. Miles, 39 Conn. 484, 494 (1872). 
36 See Sikorsky, supra note 27. 
37 The legal right of a person or group to challenge in a judicial forum the conduct of another. 
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (3d ed. 1991). In this case, the right is granted specifically by 
CEPA. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1985). 
38 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1985): 
The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or 
agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in 
the superior court for the judicial district wherein the defendant is located, resides or 
conducts business, except that where the state is the defendant, such action shall be 
brought in the judicial district of Hartford-N ew Britain, for declaratory and equitable 
relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agencY 
of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, organization or other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with 
others, for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural 
resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction. 
39 See Haynes N. Johnson, The Envircmmental Protection Act of 1971,46 CONN. B.J. 422, 428 
(1972). 
40 " ••• it [the Act] expands the right of a person to have access to the courts when property 
which we might say belongs to all of the public is jeopardized by alleged polluting activity." 
House transcript, March 16, 1971, at 739. 
41 Senator Eddy stated: " ... What we are attempting to do here is beginning in our own way 
to let the citizens say they have a stake, the right to live in clean air, clean water, and a generally 
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Despite these relatively clear statements by the Connecticut legis-
lature, Connecticut courts did not surrender the common law concept 
of standing that required some sort of direct injury or interest before 
the plaintiff could seek redress.42 Although in 1974, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court first determined in Greenwich v. Connecticut Transit 
Authority43 that CEPA did provide plaintiffs with the statutory 
standing necessary to sue to protect the public trust44 from unreason-
able pollution,45 the Connecticut courts did not seem to adhere to this 
notion for long. After Greenwich the Connecticut Supreme Court 
seemed unable to formulate a definite interpretation of how far 
CEPA's grant of standing extended, or even if it existed at all.46 In 
1975, the court in Belford v. City of New Haven, refused to grant a 
group of private citizens standing under CEPA to sue the City of New 
Haven to enjoin the construction of an Olympic rowing course on land 
allocated as park land.47 The court stated that the plaintiffs had failed 
to allege that the diversion of the park land and the threatened 
destruction of the public lands caused direct injury to the public 
trust,48 or would cause the plaintiffs substantial damage that was 
distinct from that sustained by the public.49 In 1978, the court seemed 
to reaffirm the Belford decision by stating that plaintiffs who at-
tempted to intervene in and appeal an agency decision by invoking 
CEPA still must allege an injury or a threatened injury specific to 
themselves.50 Finally, in Mystic Marine Life Aquarium v. Gill,s1 sev-
eral plaintiffs, including private citizens, property owners associa-
tions, and a public aquarium, attempted to appeal an administrative 
decision which allowed the defendants to construct an off-shore dock 
favorable environment." Senate transcript, April 15~ 1971 at 1084; see supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
42 See, e.g., Wexlar Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth. of the Town of Norwich, 183 A.2d 262, 264 
(Conn. 1962). 
43 348 A.2d 596, 600 (Conn. 1974). 
44 The public trust doctrine states that the state holds certain lands in trust for the benefit 
and enjoyment of the people of that state. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (3d ed. 1991). CEPA 
specifically mentions the air and water as the resources within the definition of the public trust. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1985). 
45 Greenwich v. Connecticut Transport Authority, 348 A.2d 596, 599 (Conn. 1974) ("We are of 
the opinion, however, that § 22a-16 is an example of a legislative enactment of what has been 
described as the expanding doctrine of private attorney generals who are empowered to 
institute proceedings to vindicate the public trust."). 
46 See Note, CEPA Update, 14 CONN. L. REV. 695, 699 (1982) [hereinafter CEPA Update]. 
47 364 A.2d 194, 196-98 (Conn. 1975). 
4B See Belford, 364 A.2d at 196-98. 
49 [d. (proposed course did not threaten the plaintiffs with any substantial damage distinct 
from that sustained in common by the public generally, and special and peculiar to themselves). 
50 Mystic Marine Life Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 400 A.2d 726, 729-31 (Conn. 1978). 
51 400 A.2d 726 (Conn. 1978). 
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in the Mystic River.52 In Mystic, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
stated that while the plaintiff, Mystic Aquarium, had statutory stand-
ing to sue under CEPA because it participated in the original admin-
istrative action, 53 the other plaintiffs lacked the personal aggrieve-
ment necessary to appeal the administrative decision.54 
This confusion on the part of the Connecticut Supreme Court 
caused the United States District Court for the District of Connecti-
cut in Housatonic River v. General Electric,55 to invoke the doctrine 
of abstention56 rather than attempt to determine whether the plain-
tiffs in Housatonic had standing to sue under CEPA.57 
There are several possible reasons for the confusion over the issue 
of standing in Connecticut. First, it is important to note that Mystic 
was not a private suit under CEPA, but rather an appeal from an 
administrative decision in which the plaintiffs attempted to invoke 
CEPNs goal of protecting the public trust from unreasonable pollu-
tion.58 The Connecticut Supreme Court was primarily concerned with 
the standing necessary for a citizen to appeal an administrative deci-
sion and not necessarily with the standing that a private citizen would 
need to bring an independent private suit under CEPA.59 In attempt-
ing to determine the standing requirement necessary to appeal an 
administrative decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that, 
while Connecticut courts were not bound to follow federal precedent,so 
they would take note of the restrictions on injury that the United 
States Supreme Court laid down in Sierra Club v. Morton.61 In Mor-
ton, the United States Supreme Court was unwilling to abandon the 
idea that a party seeking review must have suffered some manner of 
personal injury and have a direct stake in the resolution of the con-
troversy before filing suit.52 Therefore, because the plaintiffs in Mys-
tic, who were not part of the original administrative action, could 
52 Mystic, 400 A.2d at 727-29 (besides the aquarium, other plaintiffs included a cemetery 
overlooking the Mystic River, a property owners association who feared that the off-shore barge 
might hamper their future use of the river and other local property owners who use the river 
for skating and sailing). These plaintiffs were not part of the original administrative action and 
attempted to appeal the administrative decision to the Superior Court. [d. at 727. 
68 [d. at 729. 
54 [d. 
66462 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1978). 
56 A policy adopted by the federal courts where the federal court declines to exercise juris-
diction until state law issues are resolved. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 2 (3d ed. 1991). 
67 462 F. Supp. at 714. 
58 Mystic Marine Life Aquarium, Inc., 400 A.2d at 729. 
59 [d. at 729-30. 
60 [d. at 731. 
61 405 U.S. 727 (1971). 
62 Morton, 405 U.S. at 738. 
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show no evidence that the completion of the off-shore dock would 
inflict direct injury on their property, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
held that they lacked the necessary personal aggrievement to appeal 
the administrative decision.63 
The second possible explanation for the confusion concerning stand-
ing is that the Connecticut Supreme Court in Mystic was influenced 
by the United States Supreme Court decision in Data Processing 
Services v. Camp64 which constructed a two-pronged test to determine 
whether the plaintiff had standing to sue.65 Applying this test, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court determined in Mystic, that a plaintiff must 
show a specific, personal, and legal interest in the subject matter of 
the decision as distinguished from the general public's interest, and 
that this interest is specifically and injuriously affected.66 In Mystic, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs had no 
specific personal injury under this test and therefore, could not appeal 
the decision.67 
These confusing decisions in Belford and Mystic provoked consid-
erable alarm and caused one scholar to comment that these decisions 
threatened to eviscerate the intent and effectiveness of CEPA.68 
In 1981, the Connecticut Supreme Court, providing little explana-
tion, reversed its earlier narrow interpretation of standing under 
CEPA.69 In Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton,70 the 
Connecticut Supreme Court determined that standing to sue under 
CEPA is automatically given to "any person" regardless of whether 
the plaintiffs who bring the suit have suffered direct harm or injury.71 
Manchester Environmental Coalition involved a group of private 
citizens who brought suit under CEPA to halt construction of a J.C. 
Penney warehouse.72 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in an about-
face, held that the purpose of CEPA was remedial in nature, and 
therefore, the language of the statute must be liberally construed so 
that CEPA can best accomplish its intended goal.73 Outside of this 
single sentence, the Connecticut Supreme Court made no attempt to 
63 400 A.2d at 728-29. 
64 Data Processing Services v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
65 Data Processing Services, 397 U.S. at 152-53. 
66 Mystic, 400 A.2d at 731. 
67 [d. at 730-S2. 
68 Peter A. Kelly, Belford v. New Haven: Erosion of the Private Plaintiff's Standing under 
the Environmental Protection Act, 50 CONN. B.J. 411, 421-23 (1976). 
69 Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 73-75 (Conn. 1981). 
70 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981). 
71 Manchester Envtl. Coalition, 441 A.2d at 73-74. 
72 [d. at 71-72. 
73 [d. at 73-74. 
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explain the rationale behind its decision to explicitly overturn Bel-
ford. 74 
In the post-Manchester Environmental Coalition era, the Con-
necticut state courts have continued with this "liberal" definition of 
standing, requiring only that the plaintiff allege that the defendant's 
actions threaten the environment with unreasonable pollution.75 Un-
der this rationale, the Connecticut state courts have granted standing 
to a variety of plaintiffs, including municipalities,76 public officials,77 
and groups of concerned citizens.78 Currently, the Connecticut courts 
automatically grant standing to sue under CEPA, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff has suffered direct physical or economic injury.79 
B. The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof in a 
Private Suit Brought under CEPA 
While issues of standing under CEPA were essentially resolved in 
Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton,SO any plaintiff who 
sues under CEPA still carries the ultimate burden of proof.s1 In order 
to prevail in a citizen suit under CEPA, the plaintiff must carry the 
statutory burden of proof by making a prima facie case showing that 
the defendant's actions, either alone or in combination with others, is 
causing or will cause unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion of the public trust in the state's air, water, or other natural 
resources.82 
In Manchester Environmental Coalition, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision 
in County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson,83 when the Connecticut 
Supreme Court adopted a similar two-part test to determine whether 
the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under CEPA.84 The 
Connecticut Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff must show a 
74 [d. 
75 Note, supra note 46, at 705. 
76 Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 790 (Conn. 1984) (Court found that 
the city had standing only under the private cause of action under CEPA). 
77 Keeney v. L & S Constr., No. 91-702160, 1992 WL 4487, at *1 (Conn. Super. Jan. 6, 1992) 
(Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection has standing to sue under 
Section 22a-16). 
78 Lake Williams Beach Assoc. v. Gilman Bros. Co., 496 A.2d 182, 184-85 (Conn. 1985). 
79 Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Conn. 1981). 
80 441 A.2d at 74. 
81 Fromer v. Greenscape of Salem, No. 50 19 77,1991 WL 101043, at *7 (Conn. Super. May 28, 
1991) (''the ultimate burden of proof [under § 22a-16] never shifts from the plaintiff."). 
82 Fromer, 1991 WL 101043, at *7. 
88210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976). 
84 Manchester Envtl. Coalition, 441 A.2d at 73-75. 
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protectable natural resource and that the alleged activity threatens 
that resource with pollution, impairment, or destruction.85 
According to the test laid down in Manchester Environmental 
Coalition, the plaintiff must first prove that the resource they are 
protecting qualifies as a protectable natural resource under CEPA.86 
The statute itself provides little guidance as to what exactly a pro-
tectable natural resource is, mentioning only two by name: air and 
water.87 
In Manchester Environmental Coalition, the plaintiffs sued to pro-
tect the state's air from auto fumes that would be produced if a major 
construction operation was allowed to go forward.88 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court stated that because air was specifically mentioned in 
CEPA, it was undoubtedly a protectable natural resource.89 Addition-
ally, both surface and subsurface water have been determined to be 
protectable natural resources as they are specifically mentioned in the 
language of CEPA.90 
Resources that are not part of these two general categories, may 
not be protected. The most notable example occurred in Red Hill 
Coalition v. Town Planning and Zoning Commission.91 In Red Hill 
Coalition, the plaintiffs attempted to protect a fifty acre lot of prime 
agricultural land from development.92 The Connecticut Supreme 
Court determined that, because CEPA does not specifically mention 
land as a protectable natural resource, the legislature did not intend 
for CEPA's protection to extend to agriculturalland.93 The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court emphatically stated that it is not the province of 
the judiciary to supply what the legislature omitted.94 In Holly Hill 
Holdings v. Lowman,95 the Connecticut Appeals Court, following this 
logic, held that CEPA did not create a cause of action for private 
plaintiffs to sue for damage caused by leaking underground storage 
tanks because the legislature, in drafting CEPA, did not specifically 
address the matter.96 
Once a plaintiff has shown that the resource in question is protected 
85 [d. at 73. 
PI3 [d. 
87 CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1985). 
88 441 A.2d at 73. 
89 [d.; see also Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 792 (Conn. 1984). 
90 Keeny v. L & S Constr., No. 91-702160,1992 WL 4487, at *1-*2 (Conn. Super. Jan. 6,1992). 
91 563 A.2d 1339 (Conn. 1989), aiI'd, 563 A.2d 1347 (Conn. 1989). 
92 563 A.2d at 1348-49. 
93 [d. at 1350-52. 
94 [d. 
95 619 A.2d 853 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). 
96 619 A.2d at 861. 
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under CEPA, the next hurdle is to show that the resource is being 
threatened by unreasonable pollution.97 The Manchester Environ-
mental Coalition decision clearly states that a plaintiff must show 
unreasonable pollution before the second element of the statutory test 
is satisfied.98 
As mentioned above,99 the Connecticut courts have followed the 
legislative history of CEPA interpreting the word "unreasonable" in 
such a way as to limit the number of claims broughtylO When inter-
preting CEPA, the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut acknowledged that the term "unreasonable" is stand-
ardless and its true meaning must be developed through active court-
room interchange.101 Very few cases have survived the courtroom 
interpretation of the term.102 Keeney v. L. & S. Construction,103 is an 
example of one case that did survive. In KeeneyHJ4 the plaintiff made 
out a prima facie case when he presented videotape evidence proving 
that the defendant had dumped large amounts of construction waste 
and hazardous waste in several housing developments.105 The Keeney 
case is unique because the plaintiff, who was the Commissioner of the 
State Department of Environmental Protection, had videotape evi-
dence of the illegal dumpingyl6 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Connecticut courts have 
determined, unlike the trial court in the Keeney case, that the activi-
ties in question have not risen to the level of unreasonable pollution 
of the natural resources.107 For example, in Lake Williams Beach 
Assoc. v. Gilman Brothers/os the Connecticut Supreme Court deter-
97 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1987). 
98 Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 73 (Conn. 1981); see also Fromer v. 
Greenscape of Salem, No. 5119 77, 1991 WL 101043, at *7 (Conn. Super. May 28, 1991) (plaintiff 
must show that the defendant's pollution is unreasonable). 
99 Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d at 73; see also Fromer, 1991 WL 101043, 
at *7. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
100 See Fromer v. Lombardi, No. CV91-518691, 1992 WL 231185, at *4 (Conn. Super. Sept. 14, 
1992) (not all pollution is unreasonable and only that which is unreasonable will not be author-
ized). 
101 Housatonic River v. General Elec. Co., 462 F. Supp. 710, 715, n.lO (D. Conn. 1978). 
102 See, e.g., Lake Williams Beach Assoc. v. Gilman Bros., 496 A.2d 182, 185 (Conn. 1985) 
(lowering lake's depth by three feet does not constitute unreasonable pollution); Middletown v. 
Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 791-92 (Conn. 1984) (no injunction without evidence 
showing how burning oil laced with PCBs is unreasonable pollution). 
100 Keeny v. L & S Constr., No. 91-702160,1992 WL 4487, at *1 (Conn. Super. Jan. 6,1992). 
1M Keeny, 1992 WL 4487, at *1. 
105 [d. at *1-*3. 
106 [d. at *1. 
1<17 [d. at *1-*3. See supra text accompanying notes 103--D6. 
100 Lake Williams Beach Assoc. v. Gilman Bros. Co., 496 A.2d 182, 185-86 (Conn. 1985). 
1994] CITIZEN SUITS 413 
mined that lowering of a lake's water level did not rise to the level of 
unreasonable pollution.109 
In order to show unreasonable pollution, the Connecticut courts 
have also required that the plaintiff document the alleged pollution 
with expert testimony or field studiesYo For example, in Manchester 
Environmental Coalition, the court required that the plaintiffs pro-
vide traffic studies and other expert testimony to prove their asser-
tion that the defendant's construction project would cause unreason-
able pollution to the air.111 The need for expert or objective evidence 
to prove the second element of the statutory test is crucial if the 
plaintiff is attempting to enjoin an activity that is a prospective threat 
to the state's natural resources.1l2 
C. Defenses Available in a Private Suit Brought under CEPA 
Mter the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that the defen-
dant's actions will cause or are causing unreasonable pollution, the 
defendant can, through the introduction of evidence, rebut the plain-
tiff's claim.ll3 Section 22a-17 of CEPA gives defendants two avenues 
by which to meet their burden of production and thus defeat the 
plaintiff's ciaimY4 
The first defense allows defendants to introduce direct evidence 
showing that the pollution or threatened pollution does not or will not 
cause unreasonable pollutionY5 For example, a defendant may intro-
duce expert witness testimony, field studies, or other objective data 
109 Lake Williams Beach Assoc., 496 A.2d at 185. 
110 Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 73--75 (Conn. 1981). 
111 Manchester Envtl. Coalition, 441 A.2d at 73--75. 
112 Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 791-92 (Conn. 1984) (plaintiff unable 
to support contention that burning of mineral oil laced with PCBs would cause unreasonable 
pollution). 
113 Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, No. 14616, 1993 WL 279026, at *6 (Conn. July 27,1993); 
Fromer v. Greenscape of Salem, No. 5119 77, 1991 WL 101043, at *7 (Conn. Super. May 28, 
1991). 
114 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17(a) (West 1985) states: 
When the plaintiff in any such action has made a prima facie showing that the conduct 
of the defendant, acting alone, or in combination with others, has, or is reasonably likely 
unreasonably to pollute, impair or destroy the public trust in the air, water or other 
natural resources of the state, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by 
the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also prove, by way of 
an affirmative defense, that, considering all relevant surrounding circumstances and 
factors, there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the defendant's conduct and that 
such conduct is consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety 
and welfare. 
115 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17(a) (West 1985) (the defendant may rebut the plaintiff's 
prima facie case by the submission of evidence to the contrary). 
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to rebut the plaintiff's claim of unreasonable pollution.ns The defen-
dant also may prove that the plaintiff has failed to establish with 
convincing evidence that the defendant's pollution is unreasonable or 
threatens the state's natural resources.117 A discussion of this defense 
was also alluded to in the legislative history of CEPA.118 The Con-
necticut legislature was concerned that CEPA would be used as a 
harassment device rather than as a tool to protect the environment.119 
Several legislators and their aides feared that passing the statute 
without any sort of limitation would allow plaintiffs to sue to enjoin 
any form of pollution, even breathing.l20 
If the defendant is unable to rebut the plaintiff's evidence with 
contrary evidence, the second defense available under CEPA allows 
the defendant to plead an affirmative defense.121 The defendant may 
prove that, considering all of the relevant circumstances, there is no 
other feasible and prudent alternative to the conduct in question, and 
the defendant's conduct is consistent with the reasonable require-
ments of public health, safety, and welfare.l22 
In addressing whether there is a feasible and prudent alternative, 
the Connecticut courts have used a definition formulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe. l23 The Supreme Court determined that feasible alterna-
116 Fromer, 1991 WL 101043, at *7. 
117 See Middletown v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 473 A.2d 787, 792 (Conn. 1984) (failure to show 
that burning mineral oil laced with PCBs will cause unreasonable pollution defeated plaintiff's 
suit). 
118 Note, supra note 46. 
119 Testimony of James Wade, attorney for the majority leadership of the House: 
Now in framing this legislation, it was our judgment that all of us pollute the environ-
ment to one degree or another, simply by breathing. Obviously, we introduce elements 
into the environment which are not natural. And, therefore, if we are going to permit 
the use of the courts by citizens to bring lawsuits against those who do pollute the 
environment, we believe there must be a check to prevent those suits which are 
brought simply for harassment, and for no other purpose. 
Environmental Committee Transcript, Feb. 18, 1971, at 162. 
1m Testimony of Representative Ciampi: 
I want to emphasize the operative phrase there is ''unreasonable pollution." All of us, 
to one degree or another, pollute the environment, the mere act of breathing consti-
tutes pollution. This bill is intended, however, to bring judicial relief to bear only 
against those who unreasonably foul our environment .... We really bet it will be a 
major step forward in the fight against pollution and at the same time afford necessary 
protection against capricious lawsuits .... 
House Transcript, Mar. 16, 1971, at 1207-08. 
121 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17(a) (West 1985) states "the defendant may also prove, by 
way of an affirmative defense, that, considering all relevant surrounding circumstances and 
factors, there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the defendant's conduct." 
122 CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-17(a) (West 1985). 
1i1l! 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1971). 
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tives are those alternatives that are realistically and practically im-
plementable as a matter of sound engineering .124 Prudent alternatives 
are those alternatives that are economically reasonable in light of the 
social benefits derived from the activity.125 In order to satisfy the 
feasible and prudent defense, the defendants must show that there is 
no other feasible or prudent alternative to their activity.126 While a 
defendant may introduce the economic costs of the alternatives as 
evidence to show that the alternative to the defendant's pollution is 
not feasible, economic reasons cannot be the sole factor in determining 
whether or not there are feasible and prudent alternatives.127 
While a majority of defendants have chosen to submit evidence to 
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the affirmative defense has been 
raised in three cases. In Lake Williams,l28 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's decision allowing the defendants to 
lower the level of a lake to repair a dam.129 While the court sympa-
thized with the plaintiff's plight, the court agreed that there was no 
other feasible or prudent way to repair the failing dam except by 
lowering the water level.l30 The Lake Williams case demonstrates 
that the affirmative defense can be used to defeat a claim brought 
under CEPA. 
Furthermore, in Sam peri v. Inland Wetlands Agency, the plaintiff 
attempted to show that since there was a feasible and prudent alter-
native, a local wetlands commission should have denied the defen-
dant's plan to reroute the natural drainage of about eight-tenths of an 
acre of wetlands.131 The Connecticut Supreme Court stated that so 
long as the administrative agency had substantial evidence in reach-
ing their decision to allow the defendants' activities, the reviewing 
court will not overturn the agency's decision.l32 
Defendants have not always been 100% successful in using the 
124 Volpe, 401 U.S. at 411; Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, No. 14616, 1993 WL 279026, at 
*6 (Conn. July 27,1993); Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 76 (Conn. 1981) 
(Court detennines that lack of a mass transit system in Connecticut prohibits the plaintiffs from 
showing that mass transit could be a feasible and prudent alternative to the defendants' 
activities). 
126 Volpe, 401 U.S. at 411; Samperi, 1993 WL 279026, at *6-*7; Manchester Envtl. Coalition, 
441 A.2d at 76. 
126 Samperi, 1993 WL 279026, at *6-*7. 
127 Manchester Envtl. Coalition, 441 A.2d at 76. 
128 496 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1985). 
129 496 A.2d at 182. 
130 [d. at 185. 
131 Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, No. 14616,1993 WL 279026, at *1 (Conn. July 27,1993) 
(plaintiffs proposed the use of alternate road and culvert layouts to reduce the impact of the 
subdivision on the wetlands). 
132 Samperi, 1993 WL 279026, at *7. 
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affirmative defense. In Manchester Environmental Coalition,133 the 
defendant, accused of creating unnecessary pollution, alleged that 
there was no other feasible way that the several thousand employees 
could travel to the construction site except by their own cars, and 
therefore, there was no feasible or prudent alternative to driving to 
the site.134 The Connecticut Supreme Court, however, did not accept 
the defendant's argument and remanded the case to determine 
whether no feasible or prudent alternatives to the defendant's activity 
existed.l35 
D. Remedies Available under CEPA 
CEPA allows the court to award declaratory and equitable relief to 
the plaintiff upon a finding of unreasonable pollution by the defen-
dant.136 The injunction may be permanent, or it may be temporary 
while the case is remanded to an administrative agency.137 
Very few citizen suits brought under CEPA have been victorious. 
Keeney v. L. & S. Constructionl38 appears to be the only successful 
suit. Interestingly, the trial court in Keeney made a creative use of 
the injunction. The trial court first determined that the defendant, a 
private construction company, buried large amounts of hazardous 
waste and construction debris in five separate housing developments 
which polluted local wetlands and threatened the Housatonic River.139 
While the defendant disclaimed any knowledge of wrongdoing, the 
court found that the defendant buried the hazardous waste in defiance 
of environmental and hazardous waste laws.l40 In response to these 
activities, the trial court drafted a thirty-five point injunction order.l41 
133 Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68, 75-76 (Conn. 1981). 
134 Manchester Envtl. Coalition, 441 A.2d at 76. 
135 [d. 
136 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-18(a) (West 1985) states: 
The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose such 
conditions on the defendant as are required to protect the public trust in the air, water 
and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or 
destruction. 
See also Connecticut Water Co. v. Beausoliel, 526 A.2d 1329, 1333 (Conn. 1987) (Connecticut 
courts have determined that there can only be declaratory and equitable relief under CEPA). 
137 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-18(b) (West 1985) states: 
If administrative, licensing or other such proceedings are required or available to 
determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court in its discretion may 
remand the parties to such proceedings. 
138 Keeny v. L & S Constr., No. 91-702160, 1992 WL 4487, at *1 (Conn. Super. Jan. 6, 1992). 
139 Keeny, 1992 WL 4487, at *2-*3. 
140 [d. 
141 [d. at *4. 
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The injunction set a strict schedule as to when and how the debris 
would be removed and required that the defendant make a visual 
inspection of the waste and record where and how the waste was 
disposed.l42 The injunction also allowed the representatives of the 
plaintiff, the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection, to enter the property and monitor the work's 
progress.143 Finally, any delay on the part of defendant could be pun-
ishable by a fine of $300 to $500 per day per site.144 
IV. THE MINNESOTA STATE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF MERA 
A Standing in a Private Suit Brought under MERA 
MERA and CEPA are functionally very similar in their construc-
tion as both acts are designed to give a broader grant of standing than 
the common law traditionally provided.145 Plaintiffs who have brought 
suit under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, however, have 
not encountered many of the difficulties experienced by environ-
mental plaintiffs in Connecticut. Although sections 22a-16 of CEPA 
and 116B.03 of MERA are nearly identical in their wording,t46 the 
Minnesota legislature added an exhaustive list of definitions, including 
a definition of the term "person."147 These definitions have provided 
crucial guidance to the Minnesota courts and have led to a broad grant 
of standing to plaintiffs who bring suit under MERA. 
In 1973, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was confronted with its 
142 Id. at *5-*7. 
143 Id. at *7. 
144Id. 
145 See supra notes 14-16,37. 
146 Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (West 1987), which states: 
Any person residing within the state; the attorney general; any political subdivision of 
the state; any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof; 
or any partnership, corporation, association, organization, or other entity having share-
holders, members, partners or employees residing within the state may maintain a civil 
action in the district court for declaratory or equitable relief in the name of the state 
of Minnesota against any person, for the protection of the air, water, land, or other 
natural resources located within the state, whether publicly or privately owned from 
pollution, impairment or destruction .... 
with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1985); supra text accompanying note 38. 
147 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 (West 1987) which states: 
''Person'' means any natural person, any state, municipality or other governmental or 
political subdivision or other public agency or instrumentality, any public or private 
corporation, any partnership, firm, association or other organization, any receiver, 
trustee, assignee, or agent or other legal representative of any of the foregoing, and 
any other entity, except a family farm, a family farm corporation or a bona fide farmer 
corporation. 
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first opportunity to rule on the issue of standing under MERA in a 
case which later proved to be the most serious challenge to MERA's 
broad grant of standing.l48 In County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. 
Bryson,149 a farmer brought suit under MERA against the county of 
Freeborn to enjoin the construction of a road through swampland 
located on his property.l50 A Minnesota trial court dismissed the 
farmer's claim believing that the farmer was barred from asserting a 
claim under MERA because farmers were statutorily exempt from 
suits brought against them under MERA151 Essentially, the trial 
court felt that it would be unjust to allow a person who could not be 
sued under MERA to sue under the statute.152 The trial court believed 
that it would be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to halt the county's 
construction project due to the environmental damage it would cause 
while the plaintiff farmer was free to destroy the swamp at will.l53 The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the trial court, holding that 
"any person" may sue or be sued under MERA.154 The Supreme 
Court of Minnesota held that the trial court's narrow interpretation 
of standing under MERA was illogical because the state legislature 
clearly did not intend for a plaintiff to be barred from bringing suit 
under MERA merely because the plaintiff was engaged in the occu-
pation of farming .155 
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Minnesota Public 
Interest Research Group (MPIRG) v. White Bear Rod and Gun 
Club,1'OO reaffirmed its holding in Freeborn stating that the state leg-
islature created the right of each person to bring suit under MERA 
to protect and to preserve the state's natural resources.157 Later, in 
People for Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility v. Min-
nesota Environmental Quality Council,158 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court stated that there is a need for citizen vigilance to protect 
148 County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973), rev'd on other 
grounds, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976) (plaintiff able to enjoin construction of county road that 
would destroy swamp lying within his property). 
149 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973). 
160 210 N.W.2d at 294-95. 
151Id. 
152 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (West 1987). 
152 Freeborn, 210 N.W.2d at 294. 
154 Id. at 295. 
155 Id. On rehearing, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that Bryson had given the state a 
permanent conservation easement over his swamp. Court upheld the plaintiff farmer's right to 
bring suit under MERA County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 
1976). 
156 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977). 
157 257 N.W.2d at 781. 
158 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978). 
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environmental resources, and that MERA recognizes the right of each 
citizen to bring a civil suit to protect those resources.l~9 
B. The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof in a 
Private Suit Brought under MERA 
A private plaintiff who brings suit under MERA establishes a 
prima facie case by proving two elements: the natural resource in 
question is protected under MERA and the defendant's actions will 
cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of this natural resource.l60 
The first area to which the Minnesota courts look in determining 
whether the resource in question is protected under MERA is the 
language of the statute itself.161 The definitions of natural resources, 
again definitions which are not found in CEPA, provide an extensive 
list of what constitutes a protected natural resource under MERA.l62 
In addition to the statutory definitions, the Minnesota courts have 
looked to trends in federal law to determine whether or not the 
resource in question may rise to the level of a protectable natural 
resource under MERA.l63 Using these guides, the Minnesota courts 
have held a considerable number of resources to be protectable natu-
ral resources under MERA including historical buildings,164 the quie-
tude and peacefulness of a lake,165 and marsh or swampland.166 Even 
the most exhaustive list of statutory definitions and a wide reading of 
MERA's goals, however, may not be enough to protect some resources 
if they appear to be beyond the scope of the statute. 
In Skeie v. Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.,167 the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota reached the same conclusion that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court reached in Red Hill Coalition v. Town Planning and 
159 266 N.W.2d at 866. 
160 State, by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 1979); People for Envtl. Enlight-
enment and Responsibility v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Minn. 
1978). 
161 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 (West 1987), states: 
Natural resources shall include, but not be limited to, all mineral, animal, botanical, air, 
water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical resources. Scenic and 
aesthetic resources shall also be considered natural resources when owned by any 
governmental unit or agency. 
162 § 116B.02. 
163 See Powderly, 285 N.W.2d at 87-88 (defining what constitutes historical resources under 
MERA). 
164 [d.; see also SST, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 288 N.W.2d 225, 229 (Minn. 1979) (historical 
and unique interior of building considered a natural resource under MERA). 
165 MPIRG v. White Bear Rod and Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn. 1977). 
166 Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 483 N.W.2d 55, 57 (Minn. 1992); County of Freeborn by 
Tuveson v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. 1976). 
167 281 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1979). 
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Zoning Commissionl68-that farmland does not constitute a protect-
able natural resource.l69 The courts used similar logic to reach the 
same conclusion.170 The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that pro-
tecting cultivated farmland would expand the reach of MERA beyond 
the legislative intent.17l Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
likewise stated that as farmland was not explicitly mentioned in the 
language of CEPA, the court should not expand the statute beyond 
the clear intent of the legislature.172 
In Holte v. State,173 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 
MERA did not apply to chemical spraying initiated under Minnesota's 
Grasshopper Control Act.174 Using similar reasoning to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Skeie175 and the Connecticut Supreme Court in Red 
Hill Coalition,176 the Appeals Court in Holte stated that because the 
legislature failed to explicitly include the Grasshopper Control Act in 
the language of MERA, the court could not extend MERA beyond 
the apparent legislative intent.177 
Once the plaintiff has shown that the resource in question is a 
protectable natural resource, the plaintiff must then prove that the 
defendant's activity will cause pollution, impairment, or destruction 
of that resource.l78 The Minnesota legislature provided its state courts 
with an extensive definition of "pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion."l79 Based upon these definitions, the Supreme Court of Minne-
168 563 A.2d 1347 (Conn. 1989). 
100 Skeie, 281 N.W.2d at 374; Red Hill Coalition, 563 A.2d at 1351-53. 
170 See Red Hill Coalition, 563 A.2d at 1351-53; Skeie, 281 N.W.2d at 374 (both courts are 
unwilling to extend their respective statutes beyond the legislatures' intent). 
171 Skeie, 281 N.W.2d at 374. 
1'l2 Red Hill Coalition, 563 A.2d at 1351-53. 
173 467 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
174 467 N .W.2d at 348. 
176 Skeie, 281 N.W.2d at 372. 
176 Red Hill Coalition, 563 A.2d at 1347. 
177 [d. 
178 See, e.g., State, by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 1979); People for Envtl. 
Enlightenment and Responsibility v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 867 
(Minn. 1978). 
179 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 (West 1987), which states: 
Pollution, impairment or destruction is any conduct by any person which violates, or 
is likely to violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, license, 
stipulation agreement, or permit of the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political 
subdivision thereof which was issued prior to the date the alleged violation occurred 
or is likely to occur or any conduct which materially adversely affects or is likely to 
materially adversely affect the environment; provided that pollution, impairment or 
destruction shall not include conduct which violates, or is likely to violate, any such 
standard, limitation, rules, license, stipUlation agreement or permit solely because of 
the introduction of an odor into the air. 
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sota has determined that an activity may be enjoined under MERA 
if the plaintiff either can show that there is a violation of any environ-
mental quality standard or rule, or can prove that the conduct com-
plained of will materially, adversely affect, or is likely to adversely 
affect, the environment.l80 The burden rests with the plaintiff to bring 
forward evidence to support this claim.181 
In applying this test for sufficient harm to a resource, the Minne-
sota courts look to several factors. First, the court determines 
whether the resource in question is in danger of being completely 
destroyedYl'2 The court may also consider scientific or objective stud-
ies to support the plaintiffs contention.l83 Finally, the Minnesota 
courts will look to whether the resource in question is a virgin re-
source that is in danger of being interfered with or polluted.184 
Generally, the plaintiff in MERA has had considerable success in 
employing the statute to protect Minnesota's natural resources. This 
success rate, a success rate that the plaintiffs in Connecticut do not 
enjoy, is due to both the definitions provided within MERA and a 
willingness of the Minnesota courts to allow plaintiffs to use the 
statute to accomplish its intended goal. 
c. Defenses Available in a Private Suit Brought under MERA. 
Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under MERA, the 
defendant may either rebut the plaintiffs case or plead an affirmative 
defense stating that there are no other feasible or prudent alterna-
tives available.l85 The defenses available under MERA are very simi-
180 MPIRG v. White Bear Rod and Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn. 1977). 
181 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (West 1987). 
182 See Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 474 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 483 
N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 1992) (Minnesota Supreme Court enjoined construction of mall that would 
completely destroy marsh land); County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 
318 (Minn. 1976) (Minnesota Supreme Court enjoined construction of county highway that would 
destroy marsh). 
183 MPIRG, 257 N.W.2d at 767-71 (plaintiff introduced evidence measuring level of noise 
pollution). 
184 People for Envtl. Enlightenment and Responsibility v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 
266 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Minn. 1978). 
185 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (West 1987) states: 
In any other action maintained under section 116B.03, whenever the plaintiff shall have 
made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to cause 
the pollution, impairment or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural re-
sources located within the state, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by 
the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show, by way of 
an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent alternative and the 
conduct at issue is consistent with and reasonably required for the promotion of the 
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lar to those available under CEPA insofar as both statutes allow 
defendants to rebut the plaintiff's case or to plead an affirmative 
defenseYlIi MERA, however, eontains an additional statement remind-
ing the courts of the state's paramount concern for the protection of 
its natural resources.l87 Given that the protection of the state's natural 
resources is of paramount importance, the courts will usually enjoin 
the polluting activity, except in extremely unusual circumstances.188 
Any attempt to plead an affirmative defense will meet with consid-
erable skepticism, especially if the defense is couched solely in eco-
nomic termsylI! For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court in County 
of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson,l90 refused to accept the defendant's 
assertion that there was no feasible and prudent alternative to the 
current plan of construction of a county highway that required the 
highway to bisect a swamp.191 The court determined that the highway 
should avoid the marshlands entirely, even if it meant a substantially 
increased cost of construction to the county.1OO Similarly, in State by 
Powderly v. Erickson,loo and Archabel v. County of Hennepin,t94 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court enjoined the demolition of historical build-
ings even after hearing evidence that they were heavily vandalized.195 
The court determined that a feasible, albeit expensive, alternative 
existed in the renovation of these buildings.l96 Finally, in People for 
Environmental Enlightenment and Responsibility v. Minnesota En-
vironmental Quality Council,ll17 the Minnesota Supreme Court deter-
mined that the most feasible and prudent method of constructing 
public health, safety, and welfare, in light of the state's paramount concern for the 
protection of its air, water, land and other natural resources from pollution, impairnlent, 
or destruction. Economic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense hereunder. 
186 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-17(a) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (West 1987). 
1l!7 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (West 1987). 
HIS State, by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1979). 
189 Archabel v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 423 (Minn. 1993) (defendants must meet 
an extremely high burden of proof when pleading the affirmative defense); County of Freeborn 
by Thveson v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 1976). Court applies the reasoning used in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) and stated that economic 
considerations alone can not be the sole determiner of what is feasible and prudent. Freeborn, 
243 N.w'2d at 321. Barring unusual circumstances, paramount consideration must be given to 
the protection of natural resources from damage or destruction. [d. at 320-21. 
190 [d. at 316. 
191 [d. at 322. 
192 [d. 
193 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979). 
194 495 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1993). 
196 Archabel, 495 N.W.2d at 419--20; Powderly, 285 N.w'2d at 89. 
196 Archabel, 495 N .W.2d at 425 (court determines that the economic and social difficulties that 
would result if the community could not demolish the historical building did not satisfy the 
burden of proof for the affirmative defense under MERA); Powderly, 285 N .W.2d at 89. 
i!l7266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978). 
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power lines was to use pre-existing power line routes rather than 
constructing new routes.198 
D. Remedies Available under MERA 
Plaintiffs who are successful in their suits under MERA are entitled 
to either declaratory relief, or temporary or permanent equitable 
reliefY)9 The vast majority of successful cases brought under MERA 
have resulted in injunctive relief.20o On at least one occasion, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has instructed the trial court to reconsider 
a case in order to determine whether there are more feasible or 
prudent alternatives to the defendant's proposed action.201 
On another occasion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals conditioned 
temporary equitable relief upon the payment of a bond in security.202 
In Drabik v. Martz,203 the plaintiff brought suit under MERA against 
an individual who wished to construct a radio tower on a piece of 
private land that abutted a state forest.204 The plaintiff attempted to 
enjoin construction claiming that not only would the tower spoil the 
view and the public's wilderness experience while visiting the park, 
but it would pose a risk for birds and endanger the land surrounding 
the tower.205 
Drabik is significant for several reasons. Drabik was the first case 
in which a plaintiff attempted to use MERA to halt a private person 
from constructing a tower on private land because it marred the view 
from a piece of public land.206 Drabik is also unique because it is 
apparently the only case where a Minnesota court ordered the plain-
tiff to pay a bond before temporary relief was granted.207 Finally, in 
Drabik the Minnesota Court of Appeals approved the trial court's use 
198 People for Envtl. Enlightenment and Responsibility, 266 N.W.2d at 868. 
199 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.07 (West 1987) states: 
The court may grant declaratory relief, temporary and permanent equitable relief, or 
may impose such conditions upon a party as are necessary or appropriate to protect 
the air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction. When the court grants temporary equitable relief, it may 
require the plaintiff to post a bond sufficient to indemnify the defendant for damages 
suffered because of the temporary relief, if permanent relief is not granted. 
200 Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 474 N.W.2d 392, 400-Dl (Minn. 1991); MPIRG v. White Bear 
Rod and Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 783 (Minn. 1977); County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson, 
243 N.W.2d 316, 321-22 (Minn. 1976). 
201 People for Envtl. Enlightenment and Responsibility, 266 N.W.2d at 874. 
202 Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
203 451 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
204 Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 894-95. 
205 [d. at 896---97. 
206 Scenic and Aesthetic Resources, supra note 14, at 1205. 
207 Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 897. 
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of an unusual five-part balancing test to determine whether a tempo-
rary injunction should be granted rather than following the more 
exacting strictures for enjoining pollution that were laid out in Pow-
derly.208 Interestingly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals gives no rea-
son for this decision other than stating that the decision was within 
the trial court's discretion.209 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CEPA AND MERA 
The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971 and the 
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act are remarkably similar in many 
respects. First, both acts are based upon the same Model Act and are 
thus very similar in draftsmanship.210 More importantly, however, 
both acts are intended to give a greater role to the private plaintiff 
in protecting its state's natural resources from pollution or impair-
ment.211 In accomplishing this end, both acts give a statutory grant of 
standing to these private plaintiffs, eliminating the need for plaintiffs 
to show direct or personal injury from the defendant's activity.212 
Despite their similarities and goals, the effectiveness of these two 
acts has varied considerably. Plaintiffs who have brought suit under 
CEPA have found the Act nearly impossible to use as an effective 
cause of action.213 Indeed, for the first ten years of CEPA's history, 
private plaintiffs found themselves blocked on the single issue that 
CEPA was designed to eliminate, the issue of standing.214 After 1981, 
when private suits brought under CEPA survived in court long 
enough to be judged on their merits, private plaintiffs still found the 
courts unwilling to enjoin pollution unless it had reached an almost 
flagrant level.215 
Conversely, private plaintiffs in Minnesota have had an easier time 
in COurt.216 The Minnesota courts were quick to grant standing to 
private plaintiffs regardless of whether they could show a direct or 
personal injury from the defendants' activity.217 The vast majority of 
2!E State, by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1979). 
209 Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 897. 
210 See SAX, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
211 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1I6B.03 (West 1987). 
Supra text accompanying notes 38, 146. 
212 See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra notes 80-135 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 42-68. 
215 Keeny v. L & S Constr., No. 91-702160, 1992 WL 101043, at *1-*3 (Conn. Super. Jan. 6, 
1992). 
216 See supra notes 147-98 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 146--59 and accompanying text. 
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cases brought under MERA have been successful because defendants 
have been hard pressed to either rebut a prima facie case showing 
that the challenged activity would pollute or impair the natural re-
sources, or to successfully plead the affirmative defense.218 
One of the critical differences between the two statutes is the 
presence of the term "unreasonable" in CEPA.219 The term "unreason-
able" in section 22a-16 ofCEPA requires a plaintiff to show more than 
mere pollution of the natural resources, as allowed under MERA.220 
The Connecticut legislature added the term "unreasonable" to dis-
courage harassment suits.221 This one word has proven to be one of 
the most difficult burdens that Connecticut plaintiffs must clear.222 It 
should be noted that the Connecticut Supreme Court in Manchester 
Environmental Coalition,223 when it cited Freeborn224 as the basis for 
its test of unreasonable pollution, failed to realize that the Freeborn 
test specifically left out the term "unreasonable."225 This oversight 
prompted some commentators to suggest that this heralded a much 
easier test for plaintiffs under CEPA.226 
A showing of unreasonable pollution still requires strong, objective 
evidence or scientific studies and tests.227 Mere speculation is not 
acceptable for a Connecticut court.228 The term unreasonable also 
provides for substantial judicial leeway and invites judges to use a 
subjective, and invariably more conservative interpretation of the 
plaintiff's case.229 
Another major reason for the remarkable difference in effective-
ness of the two acts lies in the details of the two statutes. First, the 
Minnesota legislature attached eight definitions for key terms found 
within the statute.230 The section further defines the terms of who a 
"person" is, what a "natural resource" is, and what "pollution, impair-
218 See, e.g., County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1976); State, 
by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979); Archabel v. County of Hennepin, 496 
N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1993). 
219 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West 1985). 
220 Compare, Lake Wiliams Beach Assoc. v. Gillman Bros., 496 A.2d 182, 185-86 (Conn. 1985), 
with MPIRG v. White Bear Rod and Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 780-81 (Minn. 1977). 
221 See Environmtental Committee Transcript, supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. 
223 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981). 
224 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973). 
225 Freeborn, 210 N.W.2d at 297. 
226 Note, supra note 46, at 712. 
227 See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text. 
230 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 (West 1987). 
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ment or destruction" is for the purposes of MERA.231 These terms 
have proven invaluable in several key instances. By defining what a 
person is, the Minnesota legislature ensured that the courts would 
never be in doubt as to who could bring suit under MERA.232 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Freeborn, considering the first case in 
which a plaintiff's standing was challenged, relied heavily upon this 
legislative guidance when it made its final decision to grant standing 
to the plaintiffp3 
Second, the Minnesota courts have used the definition of natural 
resource to extend the statutory protection of MERA to a host of 
state resources. The Minnesota courts have protected resources as 
varied as scenic and aesthetic views in state forests, the quietude of 
a lake, and the historical value of abandoned row houses.234 Con-
versely, the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to expand upon the 
statutory definition of natural resource, in effect stating that CEPA 
is limited to protecting air and water.235 The Connecticut Supreme 
Court explicitly stated in Red Hill Coalition236 that it would not 
engraft additional protectable resources to CEPA.237 
The Red Hill Coalition case provides an interesting contrast be-
tween the two acts. In Red Hill Coalition, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court denied CEP A's protection to farmland238 mirroring the decision 
reached by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Skeie.239 However, while 
the decisions and the reasoning behind the cases are similar, they 
further illustrate the differences between the two acts. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court determined that farmland was not a natural 
resource because it was land in use, not land in its natural state.240 In 
contrast, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that because 
farmland in particular, and land in general, was not part of the lan-
guage of CEPA, the court should interpret this omission as a deliber-
ate limitation on the part of the legislature on the reach of CEPA.241 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning appears to be a misreading 
231 § 116B.02. 
232 See supra notes 152--55 and accompanying text. 
233 County of Freeborn by Tuveson v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Minn. 1973), rev'd on 
other grounds, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976). 
234 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
236 563 A.2d 1347 (Conn. 1989). 
237 Red Hill Coalition, 563 A.2d at 1351-53. 
238 [d. 
239 281 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn. 1979). 
240 Skeie, 281 N.W.2d at 374. 
241 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
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of the statutory definitions, while Connecticut's reasoning appears to 
be a more serious misreading of the statutory purpose. 
A final critical difference between the two statutes is that the 
defendant has a far greater chance of successfully pleading the affir-
mative defense under CEPA than under MERA.242 Although both 
states' courts have relied upon the language found in Overton Park243, 
MERA instructs the court to remember the state's paramount goal 
to protect its natural resources.244 Accordingly, Minnesota courts are 
to look upon the affirmative defense with considerable skepticism and, 
barring extremely strange circumstances, to enjoin polluting activ-
ity.245 In contrast, CEPA lacks this admonishment and the Connecticut 
courts have thus allowed defendants to plead the affirmative defense 
successfully. This arguably allows the defendants to simply pollute or 
to continue polluting the state's natural resources.246 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act and the Minnesota 
Environmental Rights Act are milestones in the field of environ-
mental law. These statutes are tools for direct citizen action to protect 
a state's natural resources from pollution or destruction. These stat-
utes, however, are the victims both of the legislatures who write them 
and the courts who interpret them. If the statutes are drafted poorly, 
providing little guidance for the courts, or if the courts continue to 
cling to traditional common law interpretations of standing and bur-
dens of proof, then the value of these statutes will be considerably 
diminished. 
242 Compare Lake Williams Beach Assoc. v. Gilman Bros., 496 A.2d 182, 185--86 (Conn. 1985) 
with, State, by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 88--89 (Minn. 1979); Archabel v. County of 
Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 421--25 (Minn. 1993). 
243 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
244 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04 (West 1987). 
246 See People for Envtl. Enlightenment and Responsibility v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Coun-
cil, 266 N.W.2d 858, 868 (Minn. 1978). 
246 See supra notes 128--35 and accompanying text. 
